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Abstract The concept of cloud computing offers
measurable computational or information resources
as a service over the Internet. The major motiva-
tion behind the cloud setup is economic benefits,
because it assures the reduction in expenditure for
operational and infrastructural purposes. To trans-
form it into a reality there are some impediments
and hurdles which are required to be tackled, most
profound of which are cloud security, privacy and
reliability. As the user data is revealed to the cloud,
it departs the protection-sphere of the data owner.
However, this brings new security and privacy con-
cerns. This work focuses on the security and pri-
vacy of various cloud service and deployment mod-
els by spotlighting their major challenges. While
the classical cryptography is an ancient discipline,
modern cryptography, which has been mostly de-
veloped in the last few decades, is the subject of
study who needs to implement strong security and
privacy mechanisms in today’s real-world scenar-
ios. The technological solutions, short and long
term research goals of the cloud security will be
described and addressed using various classical as
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well as modern cryptographic mechanisms. This
work explores the new directions in cloud comput-
ing security, while highlighting the correct selec-
tion of these fundamental technologies from cryp-
tographic point of view.
Keywords Cloud Computing  Security  Privacy 
Cryptographic Algorithms and Protocols
1 Introduction
Even though cloud computing applications are not
new, a whole new terminology is being introduced
and many changes are being made by the indus-
try as well as research community, highlighted by
Gartner [38]. Whether realized them or not, cloud-
based resources (data, software, storage, infrastruc-
ture, security) are part of our daily life, e.g. when
we use an e-mail service such as Gmail, watch a
movie on YouTube, store files to DropBox, or shop
at Amazon.com. As a marketing strategy, each so-
lution provider brands almost the same product with
a different name. Larry Ellison, CEO of Oracle,
describes computer industry as more fashion driven
than women’s fashion [57]. For example, Microsoft
has named its platform service as Azure, Google
has named a similar service as Google AppEngine.
To resolve terminology and achieve interoperabil-
ity issues National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) has formed a cloud computing pro-
gram. In [102], NIST defines cloud computing as
“a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of config-
urable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers,
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly
provisioned and released with minimal manage-
ment effort or service provider interaction”. This
cloud model is generally consists of 5 essential
characteristics, 3 service models, and 4 deploy-
ment models (see Figure 1).
The 5 characteristics are “On-demand self-service”,
“Ubiquitous network access”, “Resource pooling”,
“Rapid elasticity” and “Measured service”. The 3
service models are “Cloud Software as a Service”
(which uses cloud service providers’ applications
over a network like Saleforce’s applications, Mi-
crosoft’s 365-suite and Google’s applications like
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Fig. 1 Cloud Computing Model [102]
email, calendar), “Cloud Platform as a Service”
(which deploys customer-created applications to
the cloud like database and Java/PHP engine), and
”Cloud Infrastructure as a Service” (which rents
processing, network capacity, storage, and other
fundamental computing resources). The four de-
ployment models are “Private Cloud-Enterprise”
(owned or leased), “Community Cloud-Shared In-
frastructure” (for specific community), “Public Cloud”
(sold to the public and constituting a mega scale
infrastructure) and “Hybrid Cloud” (which is a com-
position of two or more clouds).
Many big companies such as Google, Apple,
Microsoft, IBM, Amazon, Yahoo have launched
their own cloud computing infrastructures, e.g. Ama-
zon’s Elastic Computing Cloud (EC2) and S3, IBM’s
Blue Cloud, Google’s Google Apps, HP’s Cloud-
Start, iPhone apps, Microsoft’s Azure, OpenStack
and CloudStack. Public cloud distributes services
to anyone on the Internet. On the other hand, a pri-
vate cloud is a closed network that supplies hosted
services to the users of this network. Furthermore,
if a cloud service provider (CSP) utilizes public
cloud resources to create their own private cloud
it is called virtual private cloud. However, vari-
ous issues are hampering the practical manifesta-
tion of this innovative concept; security being the
most critical one and continues to be a top issue
in the cloud computing model. Further definitions
and terminology can be found in [102].
Big data is also another area of cloud that has
its own set of challenges. Cloud Security Alliance
(CSA) proposed the top ten security and privacy
challenges for big data [47] and NIST also de-
scribed security and privacy requirements for big
data [9]. In [158, 124] surveys on the security and
privacy concerns of various CSPs are offered. Ac-
cording to the Trusted Cloud Europe Report in 2014
[7], many sectors, including the general public sec-
tor, taxation and social security, health care and
legal services, media and entertainment, financial
services, national archiving and manufacturing/consumer
have various information security concerns. YYYIn
this respect, security is still being one of the main
reasons discouraging users from employing cloud
platforms because the loss of their sensitive infor-
mation may lead to the loss of interest for enter-
prise organizations.YYY
Many researchers have been working on such
areas during the previous decade, yet, one cannot
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find a single source where most such research find-
ings have been gathered [20]. Production of a sin-
gle source, which gathers a variety of problems
hindering implementations of the cloud concept,
would really be an innovative one. Hence, while
keeping major focus on security related issues in
cloud computing as viewed by the original researchers
during the past decade, we would also give a broad
overview of cloud security mostly based on the use
of cryptography. In the bargain, we also try to shed
light on the potentials of modern cryptography in
cloud computing and try to describe how it can be
utilized in solving issues pertaining to implemen-
tation of “Cloud” (and considering all of them as
a Cryptography-as-a-service model). Then elabo-
rating the cryptographic aspect, we proceed fur-
ther to describe new directions in cloud security
by exploring certain hardware token scenarios, and
make an effort to categorize and highlight the im-
portant ones by comparing advantages and disad-
vantages of various types of hardware tokens.
(a) Scope of the Paper
This paper discusses security issues of cloud com-
puting and their broad solutions with respect to
classical as well as modern cryptography. This pa-
per aims at combining most such research carried
out on these scenarios with suggested solutions that
the reader can access in a single source of knowl-
edge. Hence, most of the relevant research has been
gathered in this paper in order to facilitate any in-
dividual interested in issues related to cloud com-
puting security. We also make an effort to address
certain new directions in cloud computing to the
future of these concepts. Security is considered as
the most important impediment hindering the adop-
tion of cloud computing concept in practical use
[134, 117, 76, 62, 20]. Therefore, an utmost effort
has been made to highlight this issue by throwing
light on the work of various researchers [52, 58,
19, 103].
It is fundamentally not secure to outsource sen-
sitive information storage to anywhere, especially
to outside of an organization. The trivial solution
would be to use standard security technologies in-
house before sending the data to the CSP (e.g.,
symmetric and asymmetric encryption algorithms
such as AES, RSA; one way hash functions such
as SHA families; digital signatures such as RSA,
DSA; cryptographic protocols like SSL/TLS, VPN,
IPSec). However, these classical solutions intro-
duce the potential risk of system DBAs (database
administrators) abusing their privileges because the
systems and applications must possess the encryp-
tion keys. Although cloud computing has its var-
ious advantages and benefits over the current IT
infrastructure it brings its own additional security
threats, vulnerabilities and risks which have to be
mitigated. Therefore, it is highly crucial to pro-
tect the sensitive information and systems in the
cloud setting in order to ensure the privacy of its
users/clients. We have also highlighted the impor-
tance of the use of modern cryptography to solve
various security and privacy problems within the
realm of cloud computing.While talking about new
directions in cloud computing, we also focus on
futuristic concepts such as token-based cloud com-
puting (a type of Trusted Computing). The solu-
tions provided in this paper are not merely the re-
search of the author(s), but are attributed to a num-
ber of individuals who have carried out research in
this topic and put forward their suggestions in or-
der to solve various security issues in cloud com-
puting.
(b) Roadmap
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 throws
light on major dilemmas in cloud computing, high-
lighting “Security” as the main obstacle in the im-
plementation of the concept. Various categories of
cloud security requirements are touched upon in
Section 3, describing their detailed security needs.
Certain contemporary solutions derived from clas-
sical as well as modern cryptography with some
new directions in cloud computing have been de-
scribed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the fur-
ther non-cryptographic security issues. Section 6
concludes the paper with a focus on the future of
the cloud computing security.
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2 The Dilemma with Cloud: Security as a
Major Issue
Computation has changed radically from central-
ized to distributed systems, computing systems are
returning back to centralized, virtualization tech-
nology in data centers which is called today as
cloud computing [52]. Cloud computing essentially
describes the development of existing and evolv-
ing technologies in a pervasive computing envi-
ronment [14]. At the same time, there have been
various challenges faced by the organizations who
wish to implement these models. In particular, cloud
security has become the most critical barrier to
have a widespread usage of cloud computing. Con-
sider the following questions to highlight some pos-
sible security concerns:
– YYYIs encryption of data or access to data
more important?
– Can data be encrypted when stored in the cloud?
Who holds the encryption keys?
– Who has access to the data?What are the access-
control policies?
– Is data encrypted during transfer from the in-
ternal network to the cloud? What is the en-
cryption algorithm?
– If you encrypt your entire data and send it to
a CSP then how can it efficiently query the
data without decryption? More generally, is it
possible to enable computation over encrypted
data?
– How does a CSP distribute the decryption keys
to her dynamic clients? More specifically, how
do they handle user revocation?
– Does the CSP have security breach investiga-
tion capabilities?
– How can you be sure that your data is not mod-
ified or deleted without your permission?
– If you want to delete your data in the cloud
then how can you be sure that it is indeed deleted
and cannot be recovered?
– Do performing operations in cloud lead to pri-
vacy issues?
– How can the CSP assure and provide the fol-
lowing services all in one: confidentiality, in-
tegrity, authentication, privacy, untraceability,
delegated authentication, accountability, trans-
parency, and access control?
– What is the data-backup process? Who has ac-
cess to the backup data? Where is the backup
data stored?
– What is the data-recovery process? How long
does data recovery take? investigation process?
– Location of your data storage and processing is
utmost important because each country has its
own legal requirements, therefore how can you
be sure that your data is stored on the locations
that you prefer? YYY
YYYFurthermore, and most importantly, a well-
known but often ignored fact is that if data is com-
promised then the CSP will be the only source
of information for an investigation and auditing.
YYY
YYY The cloud can provide exactly the same
technologies as a traditional on-premise (non-cloud)
infrastructure and the main difference is that each
of these technologies is provided as a service. These
services can be accessible over a cloud manage-
ment interface layer, which provides access over
Representational State Transfer (REST)/Simple Ob-
ject Access Protocol (SOAP) Application Program-
ming Interfaces (APIs) or a management console
website. Therefore, in addition to the existing se-
curity issues for traditional setting such as access
control, secure communication, data confidential-
ity, integrity, availability, and privacy cloud sys-
tems bring new cloud specific security challenges
[20]. We refer to Table 1 to give an overview of a
comparison between non-cloud (on-premise) and
cloud systems from the security threat perspective.
And going beyond that, with the 2013 disclosures
of special NSA programs by Edward Snowden and
existing real-life serious security issues like the Heart-
bleed, BEAST, POODLE, FREAK, Logjam, and
DROWN attacks [61, 17, 50, 33, 15, 34, 25], we
are now more concerned about the software and
the hardware of the cloud systems than before. YYY
We emphasize that serious weaknesses have
been found in many well-known cryptographic al-
gorithms, cryptographic protocols and in their im-
plementations including the underlying algorithms
for key generation [27]. Therefore, developers of
the cloud system must use cryptography in a cor-
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Security Risks & Threats On-Premise (Non-Cloud) Systems Cloud Based Systems
C
on
fid
en
tia
lit
y
Data Control & Privileges (Physi-
cal access, Credentials, Identity and
Access Management)
Locally managed with own resources, full
controlled under organization’s responsibil-
ity. Breach remains on premises, more con-
trollable, insider attacks are applicable, re-
quires additional capital investment.
Since limited control and access on the data a trust to the
CSP should be established. Data is distributed to many
servers, Location independent resource pooling, Multiple
clients affected by the shared services, Strong authentica-
tion and access controls are needed.
Data Leakage (Secrecy, Privacy) More easily managed as access to data is
monitored and controlled
No control over the access data. Need to trust CSP. Data
classification policies and processes needed. Service Le-
gal Agreements (SLAs) between clients and CSPs are es-
sential. Privacy preserving mechanisms also be provided.
Development Environment Easier to manage, easier to monitor, easier
to train personnel on use
No control on source code accessibility and verifiability,
disclosure to security bugs on the integrated development
environments (e.g, no longer control what version of a
software application that clients are going to use).
Virtualization (Managing images,
Monitoring virtual machines, Virtu-
alized networking, Mobility, VM-
Level, Malware, Availability)
On premises environment, no or limited ef-
fect by virtual machine vulnerabilities
Hypervisor is the main target of hackers. Hypervisor vul-
nerabilities can affect multi-tenants of the shared plat-
form. Allocation and deallocation of memory, storage and
other resources.
Network security (APTs and Mali-
cious outsiders, Protocols and Stan-
dards, Web Services, Web Tech-
nologies, Availability, Mobile Plat-
forms, Perimeter Security, Spoof-
ing, Denial of Service (DoS),
DDos)
Organization’s responsibility and it is ex-
pensive
CSP is responsible for maintenance. There are more sys-
tem services and drivers which means more attack sur-
face compared to traditional computing model. Secure
the data with the state-of-the-art security technologies by
expert security teams. Security patches/updates are up-
dated continuously across all resources, therefore it has
better security management.
In
te
gr
ity
Tampering Data are stored on promises under organi-
zation’s responsibility
All data transmission is done through the internet thus
may lead to loss of data.
Integrity/Data Loss Conventional mechanisms are used (e.g.,
digital signature, HMAC), No concern due
to locality except insider attacks
Conventional mechanisms do not scale certain malleabil-
ity needed (e.g., linear authenticators, short signatures,
integrity auditing mechanisms, secure deletion).
Av
ai
la
bi
lit
y
Data Backup/Recovery Not paying attention may lead to data loss. Assured under Service Level Agrements, CSP is respon-
sible.
Multi-tenancy Hard Easy
Disaster recovery Hard Easy
Interoperability Managed and processed by organization SLA, and CSA, NIST, International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) Regulations.
Downtime risk/Availability (Net-
work, Hardware, Power, and
Sofware Failures)
Moderate & Expensive Low
Tr
us
tM
od
el Reliability (Moving to the Cloud,
Human Factor, Reputation, Au-
ditability, Privacy, Anonymization)
Managed and processed by organization Requires chain of trust agreement
Compliance & Legality (Forensics,
Acts, Legal Problems, Accountabil-
ity, Governance)
Managed and processed by organization Problem of the verification of authorization and authen-
tication records, and also to check the compliances with
predefined standards and policies. SLA, Cloud policies
and controls, Data classification policies and processes.
C
om
pl
ex
ity
Storage Increasing storage for an on-premise ser-
vice likely requires an extra hardware, but
that means clients have extra and unneces-
sary hardware if it is no longer needed. Fur-
thermore, block or object (file) level dedu-
plication can be performed on the client
side (is not essential for an organization).
Cloud services are flexible and allows for increases and
decreases as necessary (pay-as-you-go or on-demand us-
age service model). Security and privacy issues still exist
with resource pooling where clients share resources, al-
lowing CSP to distribute the storage cost savings to all of
its clients (multi-tenancy). Also, deduplication decreases
the storage cost significantly but also compromises se-
crecy & privacy, however it is essential for the CSP to
minimize the the cost.
Bandwidth/Communication Managed and processed by organization
(conventional mechanisms are used such as
email, portable hard disk, and shared pool-
ing)
Deduplication decreases the communication cost signifi-
cantly but also compromises secrecy & privacy, however
it is also essential for the CSP to minimize the the cost.
Table 1 Comparison: Traditional On-Premise (Non-Cloud) Systems vs Cloud Specific Threats
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Fig. 2 Areas for security concerns in cloud computing: (1) Data-at-rest and Data-in-process, (2) Data-in-transit, (3) Au-
thentication, (4) Separation between customers, (5) Cloud legal and regulatory issues and (6) Incident response [1].
rect manner and must have the ability to fix and
correct weak/vulnerable cryptographic implemen-
tations. For example, developers need to know how
to use high quality random number generation pro-
cess which is the most crucial parts of an encryp-
tion system, instead of using weak random num-
ber generation functions like Rand() in C or C++,
java.util.Random in Java, or System.Random in C#
or VB.NET. On the other hand, kleptographic at-
tacks (also called as cryptographic trojans) pro-
posed by Young and Yung [154] can also be rather
serious in the cloud setting. It is also crucial to con-
sider kleptographic attacks/backdoors in the cloud
security architecture by being suspicious to exe-
cutable codes and checking the correctness of the
source codes.
There are a number of problems/issues encoun-
tered which have been addressed by various sug-
gested solutions, however, addressing various ma-
jor issues has been cumbersome. In particular, the
main areas of security concerns are (1) Data-at-
rest and Data-in-process, (2) Data-in-transit, (3)
Authentication, (4) Separation between customers,
(5) Cloud legal and regulatory issues and, (6) In-
cident response (see Figure 2). In order to have a
structural insight, a security framework of cloud
computing should the cover following main cat-
egories: Security and risk management, compli-
ance, identity management and access control, se-
curity and privacy data/information, security of ap-
plications/processes, network/server/end-user secu-
rity, software and hardware security, and security
of physical infrastructure.
In Figure 3, we see the Cloud Security Alliance
model which shows the mapping cloud model to
the security control and compliance check. This
mapping can be used to analyze the gaps between
cloud architecture and compliance framework, and
the corresponding security control strategies of CSPs,
customers or third parties. Note that modeling cloud,
security, and compliance helps to decide whether
the security risks of cloud computing are at accept-
able level or they should be mitigated.
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Fig. 3 Mapping the Cloud Model to the Security Control & Compliance [2]
(a) Potential Adversaries in Cloud Computing
Potential attackers in a typical cloud computing
scenario can be either internal or external. Internal
adversaries may consist of
– a cloud user
– employees inside the cloud user’s organization
with authorized access privileges
– employees inside the CSP with authorized ac-
cess privileges
– the CSP itself
– a third party organization
The internal attackers may have motivation to
learn other cloud users’ passwords or other valu-
able information for bypassing authentication, gain-
ing control of the virtual machines, logging the
communication of all other cloud users, or misus-
ing the access privileges to help unauthorized ma-
licious users gain access to sensitive information.
External adversaries may be within the CSP
which are not customers or third party provider
organizations, and have no authorized access to
cloud services, customer data or applications. Cloud
computing can be vulnerable to various adversarial
attacks from the Internet like any other open net-
work systems. Any attacker who provides a valid
credit card information can register to many CSPs
and can easily launch passive or active attacks. There-
fore, external attackers can easily do existing pas-
sive/active attacks like eavesdropping the network
traffic, phishing legitimate users’ credential, ma-
nipulating network traffic, and probing the cloud
structure. Depending on the capabilities of an ex-
ternal attacker, it can launch severe attacks by tak-
ing the advantage of the knowledge of the sys-
tem. Furthermore, the capabilities of attackers can
also be on a different level: random (uses simple
techniques), weak (uses publicly available tools),
strong (organized, well-financed, skilled) and sub-
stantial (motivated, not easily detected, greater in-
telligence).
Before we move to the real issues, we note that
cloud security is already an evolving research area
of computer and network security, or more gen-
erally, information security. Information security
basically comprises security rules and procedures,
policies, technologies, and controls deployed to pro-
tect data, processes, and the associated infrastruc-
ture of cloud computing. As cloud computing is
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achieving increased popularity, security and pri-
vacy concerns are being raised through adoption
of this new model.
3 Cloud Security and Privacy Requirement
Categories
After having gone through the description regard-
ing dilemmas with the cloud leading to security is-
sues, we move forward towards categorization of
these security and privacy issues so as to analyze
each one with an aim to shed light on the avail-
able solutions. Asset, threat, and vulnerability risk
assessment matrices have to be implemented ac-
cordingly in order to compare/prioritize risks and
to determine the correct security controls. Cloud
security concerns can be classified into any num-
ber of categories, for example Gartner [38] clas-
sified into seven security issues while Cloud Se-
curity Alliance [2] identified thirteen domains of
concern. All these categories can be aggregated
into three main areas: 1) Security and Privacy, 2)
Compliance, and 3) Legal or Contractual Issues.
YYYIn this section, we will elaborate and discuss
the information security requirements in the cloud
setting and summarize the state-of-the-art existing
and scalable solutions. YYYIn Table 2 we give an
overview of threats, vulnerabilities, and counter-
measures of cloud systems.YYY
(a) Identity Management
IdentityManagement basically consists of creation,
management and removal of a digital identity. An
identity management mechanism (IDM) is used to
authenticate users and/or services based on their
credentials and characteristics. A subtle issue of
IDMs in cloud is interoperability and coherent se-
curity when different identity tokens and identity
negotiation protocols are used. For example, exist-
ing password-based authentication solutions have
limitations and significant security risks.
Most organizations have to manage the iden-
tity life cycle of their employees, their business
partners, and their customers. These parties can
change frequently and the relationship has to be
updated, which requires an administrative action.
Federated Identity Management provides the poli-
cies, processes and mechanisms to manage iden-
tity and trusted access to systems and to reduce
identity management costs across organizations. This
allows for reuse of users’ identities and authenti-
cation methods across organizational boundaries,
and ensures efficient user identity lifecycle man-
agement, compliance, and congruence of relevant
user information between partner organizations with-
out excessive administrative overhead. Most orga-
nizations or companies which are involved in the
business have to formulate their privately owned
IDM in order to have information access and com-
puting resources control. Such organizations pro-
viding cloud services could either integrate Cus-
tomer’s IDM into their own infrastructure by the
use of federation or Single-Sign-On (SSO) tech-
nology; or they would have to put forward their
own identity management solutions [43, 137, 40].
For example,
– Amazon Web Services (AWS) EC2 uses Ama-
zon Identity and Access Management (IAM)
which allow users to create multiple accounts
and manage the permissions for each of the
new users based on the role and responsibil-
ity within the Amazon account. In this setting,
a new user is an identity with unique security
credentials which is used to access AWS ser-
vices.
– Microsoft Azure uses Azure PlatformAppFab-
ric Access Control Service (ACS) to manage
the security of user access. ACS integrates with
Windows Identity Foundation (WIF) and sup-
ports for popular web identity providers includ-
ing Google, Yahoo, and Facebook. ACS also
supports Active Directory Federation Services
2.0 and OAuth 2.0. Note that an access token is
provided by OAuth in order to grant access to
a protected resource on behalf of the resource
owner. Credentials of the resource owner like
a password are never shared during OAuth.
– Rackspace uses client authentication called “Cloud
Authentication Service” which is known as Auth.
Auth allows each user to obtain an authenti-
cation token in order to use various services
available in the cloud. Users authenticate with
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Security Risks &
Threats
Vulnerability Incidents Methodologies and Countermeasures
Identification & Au-
thentication
Passive and active attacks,
Unauthorized access to cloud
resources and applications,
Data-related vulnerabilities
like SQL injection, Man-in-
the-middle kinds of attacks,
Phishing, Human accidents,
Social engineering, Key loggers,
Eavesdroppers, Malicious code
Compromise of secrecy & privacy Multiple clients af-
fected by the shared services.
Username or other public information, Strong
authentication, Multi-Factor Authentication, For-
ward Secrecy, Single-sign-on, ID Federation, Se-
curity policies, Monitoring, Auditing logs, Encryp-
tion methods, Firewalls, Intrusion Detection sys-
tem, Antivirus, Client awareness. Biometrics, pass-
words, passphrase, token, or other private infor-
mation, Security on the client-side (web security,
malware), Cryptographic keys, Digital signatures
[80, 110, 150, 13, 141, 96, 144, 109].
Authorization (Access
Control, Privileges,
Physical access)
Insider attacks, dictionary at-
tacks, brute-force attacks, and
spoofing at logon
Unauthorized users can access the data and can mon-
itor and record all attempts made to access a system.
Consistent security policies and procedures, Sep-
aration of duties, Job rotation, Strong password
policies, Strong authentication (forward secrecy),
Intrusion detection and prevention, Penetration
testing, Minimum necessary information provided,
Monitoring, Mandatory and Discretionary Access
Control, Attribute and Role based access con-
trol, Undeniable logging protocol, Multi-user ac-
cess policies, Data access management, OAuth
[101, 135, 120].
Account or service hi-
jacking
Insecure Interfaces and APIs An attacker can use the victim’s account (by means of
phishing attacks, fraud, exploitation of software vul-
nerabilities, reused credentials, and passwords) in or-
der to get access to the target’s resources.
Security policies, Strong authentication, Activ-
ity monitoring, Two-factor authentication, Forward
secrecy, Single-sign-on.
Data scavenging Unlimited allocation of re-
sources
Data can be co-located with the data of unknown own-
ers (competitors, or intruders) with a weak separation
Proof of location, SLA, Auditing, Tenant isolation
[86, 35, 8, 108, 93].
Integrity Correctness and completeness of
data, SQL injection, Unpatched
databases, Loss of encryption
key, Privilege escalation, Mali-
cious insiders
CSP could return incorrect and incomplete results in
response to its clients’ queries, Secure deletion is an
issue in the cloud setting where data cannot be com-
pletely removed.
Integrity preserving mechanisms, Privacy-
preserving public auditing, digital signatures,
Replication of data, Error-correcting codes
[145, 148, 88, 16].
Cloud Data Deduplica-
tion
Privacy leakage while perform-
ing block or file level deduplica-
tion on both the server and client
sides.
Server-side deduplication compromises secrecy &
privacy
Secure deduplication, Proof-of-ownership [28, 94,
157, 115].
Privacy leakage Unpatched databases, Loss of
encryption key, Privilege escala-
tion, Malicious insiders
Data is often stored, processed, and transferred in
clear plaintext. Therefore, data secrecy & privacy
must be ensured during its journey.
Encryption (data in-transit & at-rest & in-process),
Homomorphic encryption, Threshold cryptogra-
phy, Digital signature, ID based encryption, Bring
your own device (BYOD), Strong password,
Strong key management, Privacy and integrity pre-
serving mechanisms, Digital signatures, Attribute
based Proxy Re-Encryption, Access Controls [138,
85, 99, 21, 141, 1, 78, 142, 45, 127, 139, 73, 65, 72,
51, 120, 16, 74, 146].
Virtualization (Rootkit
in hypervisor and VM
escape)
VM hopping, Malicious VM
creation, Insecure VM migra-
tion, Sniffing/Spoofing virtual
networks, VM Sprawl, Virtual-
ization backup and recovery.
Complex Hypervisor code, Unrestricted allocation
and deallocation of resources with VMs, a malicious
VM image in a public repository, Lack of robust snif-
fer/tracking/firewalling tools for virtualized network,
Cross-VM side channel attacks due to the sharing of
physical resources (e.g., a single core CPU, cache),
Possible covert channels in the co-location of VMs,
Uncontrolled Migration (from one server to another
server due to fault tolerance, load balance, or hard-
ware maintenance), Uncontrolled VM snapshots (due
to flexibility)
Strong isolation, Physical and functional hierarchi-
cal, IDS (Instruction Detection System) and IPS
(Intrusion Prevention System), Reconfigurable dis-
tributed virtual machine, Hypervisor security, Mi-
gration should be included in the SLA [86, 80, 6,
8, 108, 89, 16, 120].
Continuous Availability
(Data recovery and dis-
aster recovery issues)
Nature disasters, Malicious in-
siders, Availability concerns
Possibility of data corruption or failure of any
mission-critical functions [44].
Recovery planning, Access control in buildings,
Disaster & Recovery planning, Backup strategies,
Multi facility provisioning, Data dispersion, and
Data replication should be included in the SLA
[86, 112, 13, 8, 108], Fault Tolerance, Byzantine
quorum protocols, Secret sharing, Erasure codes.
Network security
(APTs and Malicious
outsiders, Protocols
and Standards, Web
Services, Web Tech-
nologies, Mobile
Platforms, Perimeter
Security, Spoofing,
Session hijacking,
Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS))
Ensuring the continuous avail-
ability, Security & privacy leak-
age.
Services and applications could be inaccessible from
remote locations in a cloud environment. Continuous
availability of cloud services can be disrupted. DDoS
and signature wrapping kinds of attacks could create
data transmission risks in the cloud network. Invisible
network created by virtual servers makes it difficult to
monitor network traffic and performance.
Information security risk management framework,
Monitoring, Provisioning, Intrusion detection sys-
tems, Isolation, Netflow, Access control list (ACL),
Authentication, Security policies, Network secu-
rity for virtual machines, Network security sand-
box, CSPs offer services that can be accessed
through APIs (SOAP, REST, or HTTP with
XML/JSON). The security of the cloud depends
upon the security of these interfaces. Cloud APIs
are still immature due to its frequent update (e.g.,
a fixed bug can introduce another security hole in
the application). [16, 140].
Web security (Key-
loggers, Malware,
Spyware, Bot network,
Phishing, Virus, Spam,
Bandwidth consump-
tion)
Malicious attack on low-level se-
curity applications, Malicious at-
tacks on insecure browsers, Po-
tentially higher cost of real time
monitoring, Encrypted traffic
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability can be
compromised
Email server, Anti-virus, Anti-spam, Anti-
phishing, Web filtering, Monitoring, Strong
authentication (SSL/TLS/VPN), Forward secrecy,
Access controls, Encryption methods, Web appli-
cation scanners, Firewalls, DLP, Email security,
Security policy [54, 70, 129, 97, 128, 60, 36, 159,
113, 91, 133, 100, 63].
Trust & Reliability
(Moving to the Cloud,
Human Factor, Rep-
utation, Auditability,
Anonymization)
Continuous availability, Security
& privacy leakage
Important aspects of decision making for Internet ap-
plications fo depth and assurance of confidence, oth-
erwise it may lead to privacy leakage. Trust can be
established based on many properties including secu-
rity, reliability, and availability.
Concrete trust model should be established, SLA
[86, 13, 8, 108], Threshold Cryptography, Ho-
momorphic Encryption, ID/Pairing Based Encryp-
tion, Attribute-Based Encryption, Secure Multi-
Party Computation
Cloud Standards, Com-
pliance, Interoperability
Security & Privacy & Availabil-
ity concerns
Need to measure the security and privacy needs to de-
mand from the cloud services and to verify they com-
ply with their security and compliance requirements.
IEEE Cloud Computing Standard Study Group,
ITU Cloud Computing Focus Group, CSA, NIST,
ISO [75? , 77, 10].
Table 2 Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Possible Methodologies and Countermeasures
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their credentials and can create/delete contain-
ers and objects within that account.
An ideal IAM should be able to protect pri-
vate and sensitive information of users and pro-
cesses. Designing and developing of a new robust
authentication and identity management protocols
and improving existing lines is one of the most
critical requirements for cloud computing. Access
control systems for cloud computing should be flex-
ible enough to ensure dynamic, attribute or credential-
based access requirements [110]. Some other tech-
nologies implement federated identity solutions (e.g.,
Security AssertionMarkup Language (SAML) [107]-
an open source implementation of the SAML stan-
dard called Shibboleth [125], authentication and
attributes; Service Provisioning Markup Language
(SPML) [105]; eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) [106]).
(b) Authorization and Access Management
Authorization and access management forms a broad
category of services that is required to ensure se-
curity in the cloud. Access Management includes
the authorization of access only to data that an en-
tity needs to access to perform required duties effi-
ciently and effectively. While authorization deter-
mines the user’s right to access a certain resource,
access management in general has the responsi-
bility to enforce that users access to a given re-
source is managed with respect to the users cre-
dentials and attributes associated with the identity
policies. Provisioning and deprovisioning are crit-
ical aspects of Access Management. Provisioning
is the process of creating accounts that allow users
to access appropriate systems and resources in the
cloud. The goal of user provisioning is to stream-
line account creation and provide a consistent frame-
work for providing access to end users. Deprovi-
sioning is the process whereby a user account is
disabled when the user no longer requires access.
This may be due to users leaving an organization,
transferring within an organization, a change in
role, etc. In the cloud computing environment, de-
provisioning refers to the termination or disabling
of user accounts in cloud platforms, or those man-
aged by the cloud-based IAM service.
(c) Authentication
Authentication is the process of verifying the cre-
dentials of an entity trying to access a protected
resource (which can be seen as a defense mecha-
nism for spoofing identity and denial of service).
Authentication is the most critical part of cloud
environments because the cloud is accessible to
anyone over the Internet. Therefore, authentication
must be done in a secure, trustworthy, and manage-
able manner. For accounts that require higher lev-
els of security, multiple factor authentication may
be required such as password (what you know),
card/token (what you have) or biometric (what you
are). It is also sometimes called strong authentica-
tion which requires the use of two or more of the
three types of authentication factors. In the cloud
platform, authentication services should include strong
authentication mechanisms for validating the cre-
dentials.
Some cloud services (like dynamically person-
alized based on location, calendar, social network)
may also require privacy to be taken into account.
On one hand, the client should authenticate herself
and use the services, and on the other hand, it must
be ensured that the cloud cannot know her identity.
At the same time, the system should be account-
able so as to detect malicious actions. Anonymous
authentication mechanisms validate the clients with-
out learning any information about their identity.
Delegatable authentication can also be an ef-
fective mechanism for cloud which allows CSPs
to delegate the client authentication to the iden-
tity providers. Hence, clients do not have to regis-
ter for each website in this scenario. Namely, they
only use their identifier which will be sufficient
to validate the authentication through the identity
provider.
(d) Trust
In general, CSPs have access and control the user
data. Therefore, minimizing the trust placed on the
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CSPs is one of the most desired requirements. Min-
imizing required trust can be achieved with ad-
vanced cryptographic techniques such as homo-
morphic encryption, secret sharing and threshold
cryptosystems (in order to distribute the trust), bi-
linear pairing, secure multi-party computation and
fully homomorphic encryption.While some of them
are ready for deployment others still need long-
term research.
(e) Physical and Personnel security
The organizations providing cloud services are re-
quired to ensure physical security of the hardware
and personnel involved in the overall cloud set up.
Moreover, they are also required to ensure that ac-
cess to such machines and relevant customer data
is restricted. Access to data belonging to customers,
by various personnel involved in provisioning ser-
vices, should be well.
(f) Virtualization, Hypervisors and Multi-Tenancy
A hypervisor, also called virtual machine manager
(VMM), is one of many hardware-assisted virtu-
alization techniques allowing multiple operating
systems to run concurrently on a host computer. A
CSP utilizes virtual machines (VMs) and hypervi-
sors to separate users. Virtual machines (VM) are
the key aspects of cloud computing where differ-
ent users (called tenants) access the same physi-
cal hardware. However, a corrupted hypervisor can
damage all systems that it hosts. One of the best
proposed solutions is to utilize Trusted Platform
Modules (TPM) which can provide hardware-based
verification of hypervisor and VM integrity in or-
der to guarantee network separation and security.
However, there are various VM-attacks where ma-
licious adversaries who are on the same physical
hardware learn private data from other virtual ma-
chines on the same hardware (e.g., cache based
side-channel attacks [155, 76, 46]. Moreover, a ma-
licious adversary can gain access not only on a
user’s data or applications but also other users’ data
and applications by simply attacking multi-tenancy
design or insecure APIs. This is considered one of
the most serious security threats in cloud comput-
ing [48].
(g) Application Security
CSPs need to assure that their applications avail-
able as a service are indeed secure. This can be ver-
ified by implementation, test and acceptance pro-
cedures for applications codes. These procedures
aim to detect a possible vulnerability and find out
its point of origin in the application code. It is im-
portant to highlight that the requirements for the
security of an application are different based on
the cloud deployment models IaaS, PaaS and SaaS
[3].
(h) Privacy
Privacy is an important requirement for cloud com-
puting, both in terms of legal compliance and user
trust. This is one of the major cloud issue which
should be considered at every phase of designing a
cloud architecture. There are many types of sensi-
tive information: personal, corporate/governmental
financial information, health, biometric informa-
tion, religious or racial information, sexual orien-
tation, job performance information, collections of
surveillance, taking photos/videos in public places,
usage data collected from various devices (com-
puters, printers, smart phones), behavioral infor-
mation (e.g., viewing digital content), visited web-
sites, product usage history, IP addresses, RFID
tags, and unique hardware identities.CSPs are re-
quired to assure that all critical data (personal as
well as commercial data) are masked against ma-
licious adversaries and that only authentic and au-
thorized users have access to the data. Moreover,
electronic identities and credentials must be pro-
tected in the cloud together with additional data or
activity that the CSP collects or produces [69].
The concept of differential privacy [56] con-
siders the case that no information of an individual
should be leaked from the database that cannot be
learned without access to it. Namely, differential
privacy guarantees that the addition or removal of
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a database item does not lead to leak the private
data of an individual.
We would like to highlight that the key require-
ment for privacy is to ensure notice, openness, and
transparency. Notices basically should include in-
formation regarding a user’s privacy policies. More
concretely, organizations should provide notices to
the users regarding traceability, collection, usage
and dissemination of personally identifiable infor-
mation.
(i) Data Integrity
Data integrity requirement means that data should
be correctly stored on the cloud server without any
unexpected modification, and any violations (e.g.,
if data gets lost, modified or compromised) should
be easily detected [84]. In general, integrity is solved
using either message authentication codes (MACs)
or electronic signatures. However, the private key
should be kept secret by the client, otherwise any-
one who has the private key can easily modify the
signed data without being detected. Data integrity
of large files in cloud servers is not that efficient
and easy to solve. This is because the utility com-
puting of the resource are not run in-house, these
services are outsourced to third parties and clients
have no real guarantee that the CSP is performing
the computation what they indeed claim. There-
fore, it is important to assure the client of the in-
tegrity of the cloud data from any unauthorized
modification. The trivial solution is to first down-
load all the files and check their integrity but this
requires high transmission cost. Hence, to guaran-
tee the data integrity and to minimize the verifica-
tion cost (in terms of communication complexity
and storage) a stateless third party auditor is gener-
ally used as an assistance who checks the integrity
for the cloud user by querying a random subset of
the data portions [41, 149, 123].
Proof of data possession (or sometimes called
proof of retrievability [83]) is a challenge-response
protocol enabling a client to verify whether its data
stored on the cloud is available and has not been
modified without detection. It is also rather im-
portant to utilize stateless and semi-honest third
party verifiers (i.e., auditors) [131, 12]. In general,
existing schemes consist of four procedures: pre-
process for signature generation by the client, chal-
lenges by the third party auditor, proof by the cloud
and verification by the third party auditor. YYY-
More concretely, a user outsources her data to the
cloud and delegates a semi-honest third party au-
ditor to perform the integrity checking process on
behalf of the owner without leaking any informa-
tion on the data [145, 148, 88] (see Figure 4 to see
the public auditing model)YYY.
Secure cloud data storage services is a grow-
ing need which leads the cloud community to have
an innovative solution for proof of data posses-
sion (e.g., Dropbox, OwnCloud, TeamDrive, Box,
OneDrive (formerly SkyDrive), Google Drive, Dep-
Sky, and SugarSync). Nowadays, clients store (pos-
sibly substantially large) files to servers and want
to be sure that they remain stored in their original
form and no information is leaked to any party in-
cluding CSPs [84]. Of course, for usability reasons
the proposed solutions should also be efficient in
terms of storage overhead, computation (includ-
ing number of reads), and bandwidth. For exam-
ple, DepSky system [31] which is a virtual cloud
storage system to assure availability and confiden-
tiality of data stored on combination of different
clouds to form a cloud-of-clouds.The DepSky uses
multi CSPs and each of them has own interface
and cryptographic key which is distributed by a
cryptographic secret sharing algorithm and erasure
codes to prevent it from insider attackers. Multi-
clouds Database Model (MCDB) [18] is another
solution to mitigate possible security threats on the
data integrity and availability using multi CSPs.
(j) Secure Data Disposal
Secure data disposal is a critical risk from the cus-
tomer point of view, because one cannot verify that
data was indeed deleted and irrecoverable within
the cloud [147]. If the cloud does not satisfy se-
cure disposal mechanisms, then this may lead to
sensitive information leakage. This vital obstacle
prevents a certain deployment of industry and gov-
ernment.
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(k) Guarantee of Image
Infrastructure-as-a-Service clouds provide virtual
machines to clients to run their software on remote
resources. Giving full control to CSPs the user is
not actually sure that the correct image is executed,
hence it may lead to security issues. Trusted Com-
puting (TC) is a security mechanism for IaaS where
execution of a virtual machine (VM) instance can
be run securely. On the other hand, the virtual ma-
chines need to be up to date from the view of both
the CSP and the customer side [114, 39].
(l) Secure Deduplication
Deduplication allows multiple uploads of the same
content with storage space of a single upload. Namely,
it ensures more optimal usage of the resources at
the cloud side (e.g., Bitcasa, Dropbox). Unfortu-
nately, encryption of data with classical cryptosys-
tems cannot be deduplicated. Hence, current exist-
ing applications have either security or storage ef-
ficiency issues. Secure deduplication schemes aim
to to reduce storage, communication, and compu-
tation overhead of the cloud storage server and clients
while providing efficiency and security against ma-
licious servers. There are four different deduplica-
tion categories: deduplication happens at the client
side (i.e. before the upload) or at the server side,
and whether deduplication happens at a block level
or at a file level. The server-side deduplication which
is run by the server is to check whether two files
stored in the server are identical. That means, the
client must upload a file first, then the server can
determine whether it is a duplicate. In this sce-
nario, clients are not aware of deduplication. Triv-
ial solutions have been proposed for server-side
deduplication. However, the client does not want
to upload the file if it exists in the server, and that
is why storage service providers employ the client-
side deduplication. The client-side deduplication
run by the client and the server interactively is to
check whether the uploading file exists in the server.
In this case, duplicate files are not uploaded. The
most practical deduplication scheme considers the
client side, because it also saves upload bandwidth.
For these reasons, deduplication is a critical en-
abler for a number of popular and successful stor-
age services that offer cheap, remote storage to
the broad public by performing client-side dedu-
plication, thus saving both the network bandwidth
and storage costs. Indeed, data deduplication is ar-
guably one of the main reasons why the prices
for cloud storage and cloud backup services have
dropped so sharply.
Message-locked encryption schemes aim to en-
sure secure deduplication [11, 29, 30, 92, 132].
Bellare, Keelveedhi, and Ristenpart in [29] formal-
ized the convergent encryption which they called
message-locked encryption. The basic idea of message-
locked encryption algorithms is to encrypt the data
under a symmetric key which is obtained as a func-
tion of the message (i.e., sk = F (M)). Therefore,
same plaintexts will lead to same ciphertexts. Fur-
thermore, the user only needs to store the key sk
and her file M in cloud to be able to retrieve it
and then decrypt it via the key sk. The scheme of
Bellare et al. still provide security for only unpre-
dictable messages which fails to achieve seman-
tic security. Bellare et al. later presented a server-
aided encryption mechanism for deduplicated stor-
age, called DupLESS [29].
(m) Proof of Data Location
Users may not know where their data is physically
located, which may result in an undesired leakage
of users data to local authorities (due to local reg-
ulations) [143, 104].
(n) Data Security and Protection
Whenever user data leaves user’s end-point, it starts
travelling via a public network to be stored in the
cloud. Therefore, the data can be intercepted and
modified by (internal or external) malicious adver-
saries during transmission. To mitigate these kinds
of attacks, strong encryption, access controls, and
authentications are required. Most significant prob-
lems is data security in the field of cloud Security
[122, 150].
In many existing cloud environments, impor-
tant data, files and records are entrusted to a third
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party, which enables data security to become the
main security issue of cloud computing. Data loss
and data leakage are both serious threats in a cloud
scenario [4]. For instance, Google’s amount of cus-
tomer information was leaked in 2009. Security
and privacy of data can be achieved with the use
of cryptographic protocols and the underlying en-
cryption and authentication mechanisms. Addition-
ally, trusted platform modules (TPM) can also be
used for migration of data between virtual machines
and physical machines.
(o) Data Storage Security
Cloud storage services require strong cryptographic
mechanism because in a cloud computing scenario
the management of data and services may not be
trustworthy and traditional security methods for
securing an in-house data center cannot be directly
adopted due to the loss of control over data (e.g.,
Dropbox, OwnCloud, TeamDrive, Box, OneDrive
(formerly SkyDrive), Google Drive, and SugarSync).
Therefore, long-term solutions have to be investi-
gated for the verification of security and privacy
properties.
Furthermore, cloud users frequently update their
data stored in the cloud including insertion, dele-
tion and modification. Therefore, to guarantee the
security and the privacy of dynamic data and stor-
age correctness is of at most importance. Here, it
is crucial to highlight that verification of correct
data storage has to be conducted in cloud with-
out explicit knowledge of cloud data. Cloud com-
puting is hosted, deployed and managed by cloud
vendors running in a cooperated, simultaneous and
distributed manner, therefore distributed cryptographic
protocols play an important role in achieving a se-
cure cloud data storage system as they are intended
to assure security and privacy and avoid root of
trust problems [138, 78, 142].
(p) Reliability
The clients outsource their personal or businesses
data to CSPs. Therefore, the CSPs should be able
to provide the reliability and trust to their clients
that their data and running applications are indeed
secure [26]. We note that an important component
of reliability is to assure availability which is achieved
with a good backup strategy. It is also crucial for
the CSPs to meet Service Level Agreements which
provide clients with clear information about con-
trols and security of the CSP [5].
(q) Availability
CSPs need to give assurance to their customers
that they shall regularize every access to customer
data as well as applications. It is one of the most
critical cloud properties in terms of usability. In
2014, Azure Virtual Machines experienced about
43 hours of downtime globally [44]. Furthermore,
the analysis from CloudHarmony showed that Ama-
zon Web Services (AWS) experienced fewer than
5 hours downtime in total for its storage services,
and Elastic Cloud Computing (EC2) and Simple
Storage Service (S3) had 35 outages. Googles cloud
storage was down for less than 15 minutes in 2014.
Therefore, preventing various attacks like denial of
service (DoS) and ensuring robustness for the in-
tegrity of the overall system are of utmost impor-
tance. Backup, recovery schemes, fault tolerance,
and replication techniques can be used to achieve
the availability property.
(r) Legal and Regulatory Issues
CSPs as well as customers need to consider le-
gal issues, such as Contracts and e-Discovery, and
the related laws according to the country of origin
of both parties. Users must have legal and regula-
tory experts in order to understand CSPs’ policies
and practices for resolving security issues (e.g.,
data security, auditing, data retention and deletion,
trusted storage techniques).
4 Minimize the Threats: Modern
Cryptography-as-a-Service
In this section, we focus on another dimension per-
taining to cloud computing security which will shift
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us from the classical concept of securing commu-
nication to the modern concept of securing compu-
tation. These directions will play a pivotal role in
re-vitalization and maturity of the cloud comput-
ing concept in the future. We take a look at those
specific directions in cloud computing, focusing
on how these techniques can help us resolve vari-
ous issues associated with cloud; and last but not
least, we analyze certain proposed solutions under
the umbrella of these new techniques.
Many researchers have proposed diverse solu-
tions for resolving cloud security issues. However,
in order to understand the problems surrounding
the issue and have a realization of the impediments
hindering the implementation of the cloud concept;
first we need to divide the entire security issues
into broad areas and then evaluate the suggested
solutions so as to transform the cloud scenario into
a reality.
Mathematical and cryptographic solutions are
the most straightforward approaches for many of
the given threats. Although they are useful mech-
anisms, they require careful implementation, be-
cause cryptography alone does not guarantee com-
plete security. Many cryptographic primitives rely
on some hard problems where for a probabilis-
tic polynomial-time Turing machine it is compu-
tationally infeasible to solve secret values (e.g.,
prime factorization of large numbers, intractabil-
ity of the discrete logarithm, subset sum problem,
learning with errors problem). However, poor im-
plementations or bad password choices can easily
enable malicious adversaries to mount brute-force
attacks that go through all possible combinations
[130]. The brute-force attack is a growing threat
because of its easier disclosure in terms of time
complexity by either evolving technology (multi-
core CPU, Graphics Processing Units (GPU) with
high clock rates) and password cracking methods.
(a) Searchable Encryption in the Cloud
While transferring data to the cloud, privacy leak-
ages may occur in existing database structures. For
example, when a user wants to search for some
data or files, he will query certain keywords from
the cloud. The cloud service will execute the query
and return the requested data or files to the user.
This process may leak some information to a pas-
sive adversary about which files a user is looking
for by just observing the query and the files re-
turned to the user. To solve this privacy issue, pri-
vate/encrypted search algorithms have been pro-
posed [32, 21, 65, 72, 74, 146]. In a searchable en-
cryption scheme, the user will send an encrypted
query to the cloud so that the cloud will never learn
what keywords the user is searching for. There are
in fact three distinct security models for search-
able encryption: 1) searching on private-key en-
crypted data, 2) searching on public-key encrypted
data, and 3) single-database private information re-
trieval [49].
CryptDB can be given as a practical and effi-
cient example which enables a large set of stan-
dard SQL queries to be executed in an encrypted
database [111]. We note that the cloud has to exe-
cute the encrypted query on every data or file be-
cause otherwise the cloud may learn some infor-
mation about the user’s data in case some files are
omitted to be taken into account. However, this
will lead to performance issues because the cloud
has to process all queries of each individual user
over all data or files. Liu et al. [95] proposed a
private search protocol called Cooperative Private
Searching (COPS). This protocol aims to reduce
the computation and communication costs while
preserving privacy individual data. Their simula-
tion results show that the computational costs can
be reduced by 80% and bandwidth cost by 37%.
(b) Privacy Preserving Protocols Based Secure
Multi-Party Computation
Secure multi-party computation (SMPC), also known
as secure function evaluation, is one of the most
fundamental problems in cryptography. In this sce-
nario, two parties, possibly not trusting each other,
wants to compute a joint function without reveal-
ing any information about their inputs except out-
put of the function. In the ideal case, this prob-
lem can be easily achieved by using a trusted third
party. “Millionaires’ problem” is a typical exam-
ple for SMPC problem: two parties are interested
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Generation Evaluation Communication
(sec) (sec) (byte)
Oblivious Transfer 19:73 0:5% 5:26 0:4% 1:7 108
1:1 6% 15:6 0:6% 1:7 108
Cut & Choose 1:1 0:8%   6:5 107
  1:5 2% 6:5 107
Generation/ 24; 400 1% 14; 600 3% 1:8 1013
Evaluation 4; 900 1% 14; 700 2% 1:8 1013
Input 0:6 20%   8:5 106
Consistency 0:4 40% 0:60 20% 8:5 106
Total 24; 400 1% 14; 600 3% 1:8 1013
4; 900 1% 14; 700 2% 1:8 1013
Table 3 The experiment of Kreuter et al. [90] for secure computation in the presence of malicious adversaries. The result
of (x; y) ! (?; EDT -4095(x; y)) where x; y 2 f0; 1g4095 and EDT -4095 denotes 4095-bit edit distance circuit. The
circuit has 5.9 billion gates and 2.4 billion of those are non-XOR. Each party is comprised of 256 cores in a cluster. The
upper row in each stage is the computation time and the lower is the communication time .
to learn who is richer without revealing any infor-
mation about their wealth. Secret Sharing scheme
is a fundamental building block of many crypto-
graphic protocols including secure-multi-party com-
putation of general functions [87]. At the first stage,
the input bits are distributed to all parties and then
the parties evaluate the gates starting from the top
to bottom (the circuit is consist of addition and
multiplication gates where addition gate can be seen
as addition modulo 2 and multiplication gate can
be seen as multiplication modulo 2.).
Andrew Yao presented a solution to this prob-
lem in his seminal work, which is known as Yao’s
garbled circuit [152]: Any arbitrary computation
f(x; y) can be represented with primitive logical
gates. One of the parties, say Bob, does the follow-
ing for circuit creation. In the garbling phase each
input wire or intermediate wire x; y; z is expanded
to some t-tuple random vectors. The truth table
values are encrypted by a symmetric algorithm and
the outputs are permuted. The permuted truth table
values is sent to circuit evaluator, which is Alice.
Alice starts an Oblivious Transfer (OT) protocol
for each input wire and obtains the inputs of Bob
(in an OT protocol Alice has two values x0; x1 and
Bob has b 2 f0; 1g, at the end of OT Alice obtains
xb and Bob learns nothing.). After this phase Alice
does not need any interaction. She evaluates the
circuit and obtains her output. This setting is se-
cure under semi-honest adversary model, i.e., each
party behaves according to the protocol.
The details of the first implementation which
includes a high level description language for cir-
cuit preparation and oblivious transfer primitives
are introduced in Fairplay [98]. Their work starts
with a high level function description language,
SFDL, in which any function is described in a user
friendly way. Later, this description is converted
into gates. This gate representation is similar to
register-transfer level (RTL) netlist of a digital cir-
cuit. After circuit creation the parties communicate
with each other over TCP/IP network. Recently,
various major optimizations have been proposed
which improve either Yao’s garbled circuit con-
struction or the bandwidth efficiency (see [90] for
the complete optimization solutions). With these
recent improvements, Yao’s garbled circuit approach
is now believed to be one of the most feasible so-
lutions for real-life secure computation problems.
Fairplay [98] and his successors applied Yao’s gar-
bled circuit implementation to different privacy pre-
serving algorithms [116, 51].
In one of the latest implementations of Yao’s
garbled circuits, Huang et al. [79] combined sev-
eral optimizations together with their own enhance-
ments. These include free XOR gate optimization,
garbled circuit optimizations, oblivious transfer ex-
tension and pipelined circuit creation and evalua-
tion. It was previously reported that when a large
function is evaluated in garbled circuit memory
overflows and very high run-time durations are ob-
served. This was reported as a discouraging case
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for secure function evaluation. Huang et al. created
an implementation such that the protocol starts ex-
ecution without having all the garbled circuit. Their
implementation saves only intermediate level gates
and the gates whose outputs will not be used again
are erased from the memory. With this observation
they made it possible to evaluate arbitrarily large
functions with garbled circuits. More recently, Kreuter
et al. in [90] improved previous implementation of
Yao’s garbled circuit schemes and give a summary
of their implementation as illustrated in Table 3.
They show that by utilizing state of the art op-
timization techniques and parallelizing almost all
steps, evaluation of billion-gate circuits is practi-
cally feasible in the malicious model.
(c) Ensuring Data Integrity on the Cloud
To mitigate the security threats in cloud data stor-
age, the subject of study focuses on either on sin-
gle server scenario or distributed protocols. In par-
ticular, distributed cryptographic protocols aim to
ensure data integrity and storage correctness across
multiple servers. However, most of proposed so-
lutions do not consider dynamic data operations
which limits their usability in cloud. An efficient
and practical distributed mechanism has to be mod-
elled for cloud data storage in such a way that it en-
sures storage correctness, fast localization of data
error (i.e., identification of misbehaving server),
dynamic data support, and dependability. Note that
these solutions assume that communication chan-
nels between every CSP and customer are already
authenticated and reliable. Wang et al. [138] pro-
posed a method to assure data storage security and
supports dynamic operations on data blocks utiliz-
ing homomorphic token with distributed verifica-
tion of erasure-coded data.
Proof-of-Storage schemes (PoS) are proposed
to allow the clients to verify that their remote files
are unchanged on the cloud side even though they
do not possess any local copy of these files. In this
context, there are mainly two approaches: Prov-
able Data Possession (PDP)and Proof of Retriev-
ability (PoR). PDP schemes basically verify that
the cloud server receives a file correctly. More con-
cretely, in order to generate some metadata to store
it locally, the data owner first processes the data
file and then it is sent to the server. The data owner
later verifies the possession of the file by execut-
ing a challenge-response protocol. Finally, the data
owner deletes the local copy of the file. POR schemes,
on the other hand, ensure the data owner that the
file is retrievable correctly without any loss or cor-
ruption. These schemes have been later extended
in several ways in [123, 53, 24, 145, 148].
In a PDP scheme, the users sign the file blocks
with authentication.While verifying, the user chal-
lenges the cloud by randomly choosing file blocks.
In order to guarantee the proof possession, the cloud
returns a short proof of possession. The main idea
is that the complexity of the response from the
cloud is constant, because of the homomorphic prop-
erty of authentication tags reduces them into a short
string. In this scenario, any malicious data modifi-
cation or deletion will be detected with very high
probability. Additionally in POR, the remote file
blocks will contain the error correction codes. The
CSP also provides a proof that the entire data or
18 Mehmet Sabır Kiraz
file can be recovered in case of an error during the
communication.
The proof-of-storage schemes (PoS) can catch
a misbehaving CSP only after the targeted files
which have already been changed. The main obsta-
cle of proof-of-storage schemes is that an audit can
verify the integrity of a file only at certain time.
Therefore, the storage must be challenged regu-
larly in order to ensure the integrity of the files that
they still indeed exist and are not modified. Ate-
niese et al. [23] considered a different approach
based onmaking changing or deleting files extremely
troublesome for the CSP. Bymaking the clients en-
code all their files into a single digital clew c, an
entangled encoding, that can be used as a repre-
sentation of all files and be stored on the cloud.
The goal is to ensure that any small change to c
will disrupt the content of all files. This approach
of data entanglement was originally proposed by
Aspnes et al. [22]. Unfortunately, in the original
model of Aspnes et al. , a trusted authority is needed
to create the entanglement. And the files can be
retrieved only through the trusted authority which
make the schemes within their framework are not
suitable for cloud computing. Ateniese et al. in
[23], the authors focused on storage schemes where
the entanglement is collectively created by all clients
and files can also be retrieved without interacting
with any trusted entity. They referred to their frame-
work as entangled storage.
(d) Partially and Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Schemes
In most current existing systems data is transferred
to the Cloud using standard encryption mechanisms
(symmetric and asymmetric encryption) to ensure
the security of the system and the secrecy of the
storage. Standard encryption schemes allow to en-
crypt the data before it is sent to the CSP and it
requires to decrypt the data at every operation. In
order to do these operations, the user needs to pro-
vide the private key to the CSP for decryption which
results in potential confidentiality and privacy leak-
age of the data stored in the Cloud. Namely, mov-
ing to the cloud gives over the control or posses-
sion of the user data and its computations. Because
user looses the physical control over the compu-
tations in the cloud, the client faces new security
concerns especially high-value assets such as cryp-
tographic keys. After a decade of research, it is
widely accepted that the most profound effect on
cloud, as far as the solutions to various problems
restraining its secure implementation is concerned,
may come from the applications based on secure
multi-party computation (SMPC) and from gen-
eral fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes.
In the following discussion, we will look at schemes
proposed by cryptographers with reference to cloud
computing and try to analyze the propounded so-
lutions.
Homomorphic encryption schemes can be used
to perform operations on encrypted data without
knowing the private key or plaintext data. Decrypt-
ing the result of any computation gives the same
results as as the operation on the plain form of the
data. An encryption scheme is homomorphic when
having only Enc(x) and Enc(y), it is possible to
compute Enc(f; (x; y)) without using the private
key, where f is +; or  (e.g., Paillier Encryp-
tion is additive homomorphic, Goldwasser-Micali
encryption is XOR-homomorphic, textbook RSA
and ElGamal encryptions are multiplicative). FHE
schemes provides the user with the ability to carry
out arbitrary computation over encrypted data with-
out being decryption, which prevents the CSP from
learning anything about the user’s data, i.e., it eval-
uates circuits over encrypted data without decryp-
tion (see Figure 5 for the FHE model in the cloud
setting.). From a mathematical point of view, par-
tial homomorphic (either additive or multiplica-
tive) encryptions are actually group homomorphic
and FHEs are actually ring homomorphic which
satisfies both addition and multiplication. Because
XOR (addition in modulo 2 as in F2) and AND
(multiplication in modulo 2) are Turing complete
(i.e., any function can be written as a combination
of only XOR and AND gates), having an efficient
FHE is the most ideal candidate for cloud security
[71, 156, 153].
An FHE cryptosystem consists of four algo-
rithms:KeyGen, Enc,Dec, and Eval algorithm. The
first three algorithms are defined exactly the same
as in any public-key cryptosystem. Given a secu-
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rity parameter `, the KeyGen(1`) algorithm pro-
duces a key-pair (pk; sk). Moreover, Eval takes as
input pk, a circuit C and a set of ciphertexts ' =
(1; : : : ; k) with i=Enc(pk;mi), i = 1; : : : ; k
and outputs a ciphertext . The scheme is homo-
morphic if for any key-pair (pk; sk) generated by
KeyGen(1`), any circuitC, any plaintextsm1; : : : ;mk,
and any ciphertexts ' = (1; : : : ; k) with i =
Enc(pk;mi), we have that
= Eval(pk; C; ') implies C(m1; : : : ;mk) =
Dec(sk; ):
The first FHE scheme was introduced by Craig
Gentry in 2009 [66]. He constructed a somewhat
homomorphic encryption scheme (SWHE) using
ideal lattices that is limited to evaluate polynomi-
als of low-degree over encrypted data (the limi-
tation of low-degree polynomials caused by the
noise of ciphertexts, which grows slightly during
homomorphic addition, and explosively during ho-
momorphic multiplication). Then he modified the
SWHE scheme to make it evaluate its own decryp-
tion circuit making it bootstrappable (bootstrap-
ping runs the decryption function on the cipher-
text homomorphically, using an encrypted secret
key, which will reduce noise). Last but not least,
he showed that FHE can be implemented through
a recursive, self embedded, bootstrappable homo-
morphic encryption scheme (SWHE). Researchers
have since suggested variants/improvements to Gen-
try’s model [45, 127, 139]. Use of FHE schemes
solves many of the cloud data security problems
discussed in Section 3 since the client can send his
request as encrypted, the CSP handles this request
also under encryption and sends the encrypted re-
sults back to the client who can decrypt the re-
sult. The CSP does not see what has happened.
Although there are significant improvements the
existing implementations are unfortunately not yet
to be practical in the cloud setting [119, 73].
Using Principal-Ideal Lattices of Prime De-
terminant. Some variants of Gentry’s scheme yield
a smaller key size, a simpler encryption/decryption
algorithm and can be described without resorting
to lattices [45, 127]. However, it was not a prac-
tical FHE scheme because they were not able to
support large enough dimension to make Gentry’s
squashing technique work, so it was not easy to
implement the bootstrapping functionality that is
needed to get the complete scheme to work. Later
Gentry and Halevi [67] presented a work in the
same direction of Smart and Vercauteren’s imple-
mentation [126]. They showed a number of opti-
mizations that allow implementing all aspects of
the scheme, including the bootstrapping function-
ality.
Brakerski et al. [37] presented a new way of
constructing leveled FHE schemes which can eval-
uate arbitrary polynomial-size circuits without Gen-
try’s bootstrapping procedure. The proposed scheme
is based on the learning with error (LWE) or ring-
LWE (RLWE) problems that have 2 security against
known attacks ( 2 f0; 1g is a security parame-
ter). For RLWE, the authors achieved that
– A leveled FHE scheme that does not use the
bootstrapping procedure, can evaluate L-level
arithmetic circuits with eO(L3) per-gate com-
putation. The security of the underlying mech-
anism is based on RLWE for an approximation
factor exponential in L.
– A leveled FHE scheme that uses the bootstrap-
ping procedure, can evaluate the circuits witheO(2) the per-gate computation including the
bootstrapping technique. Note that the complex-
ity is independent of L and the security of the
underlying mechanism is based on the hard-
ness of RLWE for quasi-polynomial factors.
Their scheme has improved the previous ex-
isting schemes which required sub-exponential
factors.
The authors found similar results for LWE as
well but they said that the performance were worse
than using RLWE.
(e) Token-Based Cloud Computing
Traditional security measures include user authen-
tication to enable data access. After user authen-
tication transmission security needs to be estab-
lished. The Secure Sockets Layer protocol handles
authentication, key exchange and message confi-
dentiality through symmetric and asymmetric cryp-
tographic mechanisms. The underlying protocol is
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b
b Has a large encrypted storage
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b Computes f(Enc(x);Enc(y)) without
any knowledge on x and y.
Using a Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Fig. 5 Fully Homomorphic Encryption Applied to the Cloud Computing
mature and also used extremely widely in network
applications. What is new and crucial about cloud
computing is that sensitive user information leaves
the secure premises of an organization and is saved
in the CSP’s data centers. When sensitive user data
is saved in the cloud, the CSP has a degree of con-
trol over users’ data. Unfortunately current cloud
models are not transparent after this point. Data
owners do not know if their data is abused or leaked.
Current security approaches try to make the data
secure in devices and in networks where it travels.
This model is defined as device-centric or network-
centric.
For cloud computing and other new informa-
tion technologies information-centric protection of
data was introduced by Chong et al. [42]. In this
concept, data needs to be self-defending and self-
describing. Namely, when the data is accessed, it
should consult its describers and attempt to re-create
a secure environment and reveal only if the en-
vironment is reliable through the use of Trusted
Computing. Since information-centric security is
not easily realizable yet, device-centric security so-
lutions have been adopted for cloud computing.
In some of these approaches data owners have a
degree of control over cloud hardware. This con-
trol is made available through a trusted comput-
ing solution. An independent trusted monitor at
the cloud server which audits all data access on
the cloud server may assure data owner that cer-
tain access policies are not violated.
Trusted computing has another potential role
in securing user data at cloud hardware which is
described as token-based cloud computing [121].
A hardware token is a device which can perform
cryptographic operations in a tamper-proof and leakage-
free way (e.g., standard smart cards, USB devices).
In cloud computing context a hardware token can
reside either at user side or at the CSP. Depending
on the protocol there can be only one token at one
of the communicating sides or there can be two
tokens at each of the sides. For example, Sadeghi
et al. in [121] proposed to use a hardware token
in order to outsource computation to an untrusted
CSP. Roughly speaking, the token generates Yao’s
garbled circuits of a given functionality during the
setup phase and then forwards them to the CSP
to be evaluated without leaking information about
the user’s data. In the following, we will mention
different aspects of token-based cloud implemen-
tations.
1. Functionality.Hardware security token can be
used for various purposes. Strong two-factor
authentication, oblivious database search (ODBS),
verifiable encryption, and secure function eval-
uation (SFE) are some of the functionalities
that hardware tokens are used for. It is clear
that essentially anyone who obtains the cor-
rect credentials can access the sensitive data
because sensitive data of a client is not stored
on a local computer but in the cloud. There-
fore, strong two-factor authentication is one of
the most vital requirements for organizations.
Hardware tokens provide the most mature so-
lutions to replace the static passwords and mit-
igate the risks.
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2. Weight. The underlying cryptographic algorithms
in a token may be lightweight or expensive de-
pending on the complexity of the cryptographic
primitives. For example, public key cryptographic
computations are relatively expensive whereas
a lightweight token can only perform less com-
plex operations such as executing symmetric
algorithms. In general, tamper-proof tokens have
physical protection measures to prevent key ex-
posure, reverse engineering and other attacks.
As an example of an expensive token we can
consider WebAlps application of Jiang et al.
[82]. They proposed to employ a secure co-
processor together with the existing cloud in-
frastructure. This coprocessor is chosen as IBM-
4758 secure coprocessor platform. Sensitive ap-
plications are hosted at the trusted co-processor.
When the client wants to access these secure
applications, an authenticated SSL connection
between the client and secure co-processor is
established. In this example the client needs to
trust in secure co-processor. Here the root of
trust comes from a third party provider, namely
IBM.
TrustedPals is another secure multi-party com-
putation solution which uses smart cards in each
party [64]. They use Java Card Technology en-
abled smart cards as trusted tokens. The upper
layer of the protocol is implemented as a stan-
dard Java application. Smart cards are used to
encrypt and decrypt all protocol messages. The
host application is used to handle the commu-
nication parts of the protocol. In this example
two light tokens are used. Root of trust comes
again from a third party smart card provider.
3. Hardware-Based Trust.Depending on partic-
ular security concerns, a protocol might require
a hardware-based root of trust and therefore
hardware tokens can be provided for both the
client and the CSP. Note that secure hardware
token processors can support expensive asym-
metric cryptographic algorithms and clients can
access to their data and run applications se-
curely, and can even add an extra protection
with a PIN.
Cryptography-as-as-a-Service (CaaS) model per-
forms cryptographic operations (like encryp-
tion/decryption) on behalf of a device via web
services APIs. In order to send a message M
from a clientCA to another clientCB securely,
then CA sends M to the CaaS provider, CaaS
encrypts as Encrypt(M) and sends it back to
CA. Next,CA forwards the encryption Encrypt(M)
to CB which also sends to CaaS for decryp-
tion. CaaS decrypts and sends the message M
to CB . In this model, the clients (i.e., devices)
never learn the cryptographic keys because they
are only stored in the CaaS provider.
4. State Property. Secure two-party communica-
tions need strong random generators such as
tamper-proof hardware tokens for encryption
of protocol messages. Furthermore, Goldreich
and Ostrovsky shows that these tokens can also
be used for software protection [68]. Running
a secure multi-party computation protocol on a
tamper-proof hardware is considered with ei-
ther stateful or stateless tokens. If a crypto-
graphic algorithm is used inside the token and
the token needs to preserve the state of the al-
gorithm, those tokens are called as “stateful to-
kens” [55]. Therefore, the memory of stateful
tokens must be updatable which may lead to
reset attacks. If the algorithm is used in a pro-
tocol but the protocol does not need to recall
a previous state they are called as “stateless
tokens”. By definition stateful tokens are re-
quired to be tamper-proof, therefore stateless
tokens are more being preferred.
In order to thwart the attacks against the inse-
cure devices such as API, the security model of
the CSP should be carefully analyzed and the im-
plementation of strong authentication and access
controls via secure transmission should be devel-
oped and verified in a correct manner.
YYYWe illustrate the state-of-the-art technol-
ogy readiness of modern cryptographic mechanisms
in Table 4. In the following sections, we will focus
on other environmental security, compliance and
legal/contractual issues. YYY
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Ready
for
Deployment
Short-Term
Research
Needed
Longer-Term
Research
Needed
Secure Multi-Party Computation X X 7
Searchable Encryption 7 X X
Message Locked Encryption X X 7
Fully Homomorphic Encryption 7 7 X
Order Preserving Encryption 7 7 X
Attribute Based Encryption 7 X 7
Delegated/Federated Authentication X X 7
Delegated Computation 7 7 X
Proof of Data Possession X X 7
Cloud Key Management X X 7
Data Integrity X X 7
Access Policy Based Encryption X X 7
Secure Data Dissemination X X 7
Table 4 Technology Readiness of Modern Cryptographic Mechanisms (partly taken from [59] report)
5 Cloud Computing Security Framework:
Other Security Issues and Existing
Methodologies
Cloud computing security framework, aimed at en-
suring customer information security, is comprised
of two types of systems: Cloud computing server
system and cloud computing standard system. Cloud
computing server system comprises cloud security
application services, cloud fundamental security
services and credible cloud infrastructure services.
This cloud security framework offers new ideas for
solving the cloud security issues, which is an im-
portant practical methodology for guaranteeing the
data security.
(a) Side-Channel Attacks
One of the most important emerging concerns are
the side-channel attacks against virtualization plat-
forms. Many of these attacks are using cache-timing
attacks where the memory access pattern reveals
information about confidential data. An attacker
may put her virtual machine (VM ) on the same
physical machine as another targeted user’s VM in
order to gain confidential knowledge from targeted
VM. In [118], Risten et al. show a case study for
the Amazon EC2 service and call this type of at-
tack a cross-VM side-channel attack. Crane et al.
in [46] proposed a mechanism to thwart cache-
based side-channel attacks without any hardware
changes.
(b) Social Networking Attacks
Use of popular corporate and personal social net-
working sites increase the risk of advanced social
engineering attack. Many employees of CSPs, sup-
pliers, and vendors will be listed on social net-
working sites and are probably connected to each
other. Because of these relationships, malicious ad-
versaries can easily set up fake identities in order
to gain honest parties’ trust, and use their private
information (e.g., personal interests, roles, knowl-
edge) to prepare their attacks. In [136] Timm and
Perez highlights the most dangerous attacks to so-
cial networks like Facebook, Twitter, andMyspace.
They also propose possible solutions to mitigate
and defend against such attacks in details.
(c) Bring Your Own Device (BYOD): Mobile
Device Attacks
Cloud enterprises has a lot interest in the “Bring
your own Device” (BYOD) trend. They are basi-
cally not providing any hardware/software to their
customers, instead by adopting BYOD policies, each
customer can choose their own computers or mo-
bile devices (like smart phones). Note that in this
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case the customers can work more efficiently and
effectively because they are already familiar with
these devices [99].With the increasing use of smart
phones cloud connectivity is now no longer lim-
ited to laptops or desktop PCs. Attacks on mobile
devices are now emerging because similar vulner-
abilities exist as traditionally associated with lap-
tops and desktop PCs.
As mobile devices now have equivalent fea-
tures as in traditional devices, Internet-based spy-
ware, worms or even physical attacks are more likely
to occur against mobile devices.
(d) Compliance
There are various regulations related to the storage
and use of data, e.g., Payment Card Industry Data
Security Standard (which regulates any organiza-
tion that stores, transmits, or transacts credit card
data), the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act (include requirements about security
and privacy of health data), and the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (which aims to protect shareholders and the
general public from accounting errors, fraudulent
practices, and business disclosures). Standard re-
porting and audit trails have to be performed with
such regulations and CSPs should be forced to al-
low their customers to comply appropriately with
these regulations.
– Business Continuity and Data Recovery.Busi-
ness continuity and data recovery plans have to
be modelled properly and be in place by CSPs
in order to ensure that cloud services can still
be sustainable and data loss can be recovered
in case of a disaster or an emergency. These
plans should be shared with the users and re-
viewed by them as well [112].
– Logs and Audit Trails. Logs and audit trails
should be kept continuously and CSPs should
work with their customers to assure that these
logs and audit trails are properly secured and
maintained.Whenever a customer requests these
logs and trails, it should be accessible for the
purposes of inspection (e.g., e-Discovery) [112].
Performing internal and external audits regu-
larly in order to monitor CSP’s compliance to
agreed terms, conditions, standards and regu-
lations is considered good practice.
An identity and access management mechanism
should be able to track and satisfy all the ba-
sic audit requirements (e.g., track who has ac-
cess to what information, check whether the
access is required to perform the job, monitor
usage logs and report them properly. Monitor-
ing the use of cloud resources from user ac-
cess point of view is critical, as it is needed to
identify and prevent access violations. Further-
more, the system should be designed in such
a way that risk exposure is quantifiable in or-
der to reduce the residual risk. In order to man-
age the audit correctly, separation of duties and
role-based access control mechanisms should
also be developed.
– Unique Compliance Requirements.CSPs sup-
ply data center services which may also be sub-
ject to compliance requirements. Because cus-
tomer data may not remain in the same data
center or the same provider’s cloud, using a
CSP can lead to additional security and privacy
concerns considering data jurisdiction. Note that
data jurisdiction is a crucial concern for all pri-
vate or public cloud providers.
(e) Legal and Contractual Issues
CSPs and their customers would have to negotiate
terms considering liability for any risks they un-
dertake, intellectual property, and end-of-service.
Note that it is important to specify the require-
ments about how to resolve in case of data loss or
compromise. Similarly, the end-of-service should
cover when the CSP can send the customer’s data
and applications back to her [81, 151].
(f) Service Level Agreement
The Service Level Agreements (Cloud SLAs) de-
fine the legal relationship between a cloud service
customer and a CSP of a cloud service. They are
in fact crucial components which help the parties
agree upon certain points and protect both sides.
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There are typically five different cloud security
levels: 1) Server access security, 2) Internet access
security, 3) Database access security, 4) Data pri-
vacy, and 5) Program access security. Cloud SLA
additionally defines the relationship between the
CSP and its clouds, which includes definition of
services, performance management, problemman-
agement, customer duties and responsibilities, war-
ranties and remedies, disaster recovery, and busi-
ness continuity. Cloud SLA also discusses about
other issues like security policies, security meth-
ods and their implementations [86, 13, 8]. Note
that Cloud SLAs will be naturally different because
of distinct cloud services and deployment models,
which makes SLAs more complicated. Therefore,
Cloud SLAs will not often be the same for differ-
ent CSPs and customers will not easily compare
cloud services.
6 Conclusion
Because of flexibility and lower cost advantages
cloud computing offers attractive alternatives to IT
departments. Since the concept of cloud comput-
ing was proposed in its modern form around 2006,
cloud security has become the most critical obsta-
cle to have widespread usage. When considering
solutions to the cloud computing problems, it is
important to highlight that the main security is-
sues for the cloud setting are essentially old prob-
lems. Main security problems in cloud comput-
ing can be classified into data security and pri-
vacy, data storage security and adversarial attacks.
Many researchers have developed various models
or schemes for solving such problems. Modern cryp-
tographic mechanisms are expected to enhance data
privacy and in general strengthen cloud computing
security in the near future.
After a thorough discussion on various prob-
lems/solutions related to cloud computing, derived
from classical as well as modern cryptography, re-
spectively; we emphasize that it is very important
to develop and transform these for the real set-
ting we have today. As in all engineering prob-
lems, there are trade-offs to decide on cloud com-
puting. While new innovations emerge, they intro-
duce new problems and new innovations are found
to solve these new problems. Innovations of cars
caused traffic accidents, but later traffic lights were
introduced to solve that problem. Nowadays elec-
tric cars are being introduced as a solution to envi-
ronmental problems. Analogously cloud comput-
ing is creating new opportunities but causing new
problems, some of which are serious security con-
cerns. Modern cryptographic approaches are try-
ing to overcome those deficiencies.
Markets keep developing new software appli-
cations, platforms, and infrastructure as a service
over the “Cloud”. These services are already ac-
cessible on a pay-per-use basis and provide great
flexibility and alternatives to reduce capital costs.
Open source clouds such as the Ubuntu cloud, Open-
Stack, Eucalyptus, Open-Nebula, and CloudStack
offer various services can give the chance to try
out the benefits of cloud computing. A real op-
portunity will exist for the future once the world
achieves a mature cloud computing technology. Peo-
ple can all benefit from countless advantages tech-
nology offers. The cloud technology is already widely
in use today and with the advent of impressive re-
sults this will certainly continue to grow.
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